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Abstract 
The modelling of business processes is widely used in enterprises. Though this is very common, 
requirements for identity management and access control are often collected separately in 
documents or requirement tools. Due to the business-driven background of access control, this kind 
of requirement should be collected at the business site's business process model. This work 
introduces a meta-model for modelling access control requirements at the business process level. It 
combines the model and its requirements, reducing the risk of inconsistencies caused by process 
changes. A model-driven development process utilises the enriched models for generating policies 
for different identity management products. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The success of the internet, the ongoing globalisation and resulting needs for faster communication 
and interaction with business partners as well as the implementation of new law and business 
regulations like Basel II or Sarbanes-Oxley Act [6] lead to a demand for new solutions. Service-
oriented architecture (SOA) tries to cope with those needs: The service-oriented architecture 
paradigm often uses the modelling of business processes, which is widely used and supported by a 
variety of well established notations [20, 32, 34] and tools. Despite these facts, (non-functional) 
requirements which are strongly related to the business process are commonly not integrated in its 
model. A lot of non-functional requirements arise in the area of identity management (IdM) [1], 
where access control is an important part. Currently, these IdM-related requirements are often 
“specified” in a non-formalised manner as unstructured text by the business department. If these 
specifications are not complete and cannot be understood by the IT security department, a 
complicated and error prone coordination process between both departments arises [cf. 7]. At this 
time, the application owner – namely the business department – loses its “requirement 
sovereignty”. Therefore it is highly dependent on the support of another department in formulating 
their own IdM requirements. Such a separation of the business process model and its related IdM 
requirements may easily result in inconsistencies if changes are not adapted immediately in all 
specification documents. In the following, we suggest a solution for this problem by enriching the 
business process model with a specification of IdM requirements. The model is used as the origin 
of a model-driven software development approach to generate concrete access control policies for 
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service-oriented architectures. This work is based on a cooperation project between iC Consult 
GmbH, an independent service provider in the area of identity management, the department of 
Media Computing at the University of Regensburg and the research group Cooperation and 
Management at the University of Karlsruhe. The paper is organised as follows: Section 1 gives a 
short introduction to identity management and its relation to business process management. In 
section 2, we introduce our UML2 Profile for IdM as well as the Web Services Access Control 
Markup Language (WSACML), an access control meta-model for service-oriented architecture. 
Based on both specifications, a model-driven policy development process is described. The 
application to a real business scenario from the banking domain is shown in section 3. Section 4 
discusses related work, and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
1.1. Main Aspects of Identity Management 
 
With the increasing complexity of the IT landscape in enterprises and the penetration of nearly all 
critical business processes by information technology, identity management is a key factor and one 
of the main building blocks of IT security [13]. IdM comprises authentication of identities, the 
authorisation of resource access as well as the logging of all events relevant for auditing 
requirements. These three pillars of IdM are embedded in several processes in order to mitigate its 
complexity. Policies containing permissions build the base for access control decisions [27]. They 
state whether an authenticated subject is allowed to access or interact with an object or a resource 
within the IT system. In the scope of regulations (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act or Basel II), the 
requirements for the administration and documentation of access permissions and policies lead to a 
demand for sophisticated IdM solutions. A reference architecture for such a solution is shown in 
[3]; [17] describes an architecture for IdM in federated environments. 
 
1.2. Identity Management and Business Process Modelling 
 
The importance of business processes models became obvious with the idea of business process 
reengineering [15] in the 90ies and with the upcoming of the service-oriented architecture paradigm 
[36]. The nearly arbitrary combination of single sub-processes or loosely coupled services to 
business processes in the sense of service-orientation is only possible on the base of meaningful 
and executable models. This enables enterprises to cope with market challenges and new business 
regulations in a flexible and agile way [36]. The focus lies on the optimal support of the business 
process whereas the IT plays a supporting role in the background. The modelling of business 
processes can be done in different notations like Event-driven Process Chains (EPC) [20], the 
Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) [32] or the behaviour diagrams of the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) [34]. 
 
The short lifecycle of business processes and their opening to other businesses in the context of 
B2B-scenarios requires a constant adoption of IdM requirements in order to reach and guarantee 
high security standards [21]: On the one hand, functional specifications regarding identities, roles 
and permissions are constantly changing, on the other hand, changing specifications of the 
organisational layer, e.g. for supporting privacy or avoiding corruption play an increasing role in 
enterprise security. In order to meet these demands, traditionally hard coded security mechanisms 
are replaced by dynamic policies which are changeable at runtime. 
 
Closing the gap between specification of IdM requirements in documents and requirement 
management tools and the business process' model is still not done, resulting in different 
complementing specifications [11, 16, 25, 37]. The coupling of the business process' models and its 
security requirements will ensure a consistent state over all changes – functional ones as well as 
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those affecting security issues. The management of security relevant aspects will be tied stronger to 
the business process' development, avoiding inconsistencies in its protection. The business 
department should be supplied with tools not only for modelling their processes, but also for 
integrating their IdM requirements in those models. 
 
2. Modelling and Transforming IdM Requirements within Business Processes 
 
In order to cope with the problems described above and to force the coupling of business process 
and its security requirements, we propose the modelling of requirements in business process 
models. A model-driven approach that generates concrete security policies based on the models 
will be introduced in the following sections. 
 
2.1. The Development Process and its Relation to Model-driven Architecture 
 
The development process typically starts with defining the business process in the business 
department. Preparatory steps like use-case analyses or textual specifications etc. are not in the 
focus of this paper: Our contribution starts with the business process already modelled and we see 
this point as the computational independent model (CIM) in the sense of OMGs' Model-driven 
Architecture (MDA) [31]. In this view, the CIM contains all information of the business process – 
enriched with security specifications based on the UML2 profile for IdM. A semi-automatic 
transformation process with possible manual additions leads to the platform independent model 
(PIM), containing only security specifications at a platform neutral level. A meta-model for this has 
been presented as WSACML in [8]. Its generic design does not include any (security) product 
specific elements, so that the last transformation step can create platform specific code (PSC) for 
different platforms like CA SiteMinder or IBM Tivoli Access Manager. 
 
2.2. Securing a Business Process by the UML2 Profile for Identity Management 
 
The business department should be able to define its own or compliance-driven IdM requirements, 
using their specific domain knowledge in business process modelling. This enables a fully model-
driven software development process, starting with the modelling of IdM requirements in the 
business department and resulting in security policies for a specific software system. 
We utilise UML behaviour diagrams, especially activity diagrams, used for modelling data- and 
control flows as well as workflows [4, 35]. UML itself is based on a meta-model supported by a 
variety of tools and known and accepted in enterprises. The UML profile mechanism offers a 
lightweight approach to extend this meta-model. This can be done by adding new elements for 
special domains without losing UML’s tool support. Stereotypes do not change the meta-model but 
extend and specify existing UML meta-classes for special use-cases. New elements are named and 
can immediately be used as the profiles' elements. Constraints are used in order to restrict elements 
in their behaviour, and can be expressed in prose, (pseudo-) programming languages or in dedicated 
languages like OCL (Object Constraint Language) [33]. Constraints must not be in conflict with 
inherited constraints of the meta-class. Tagged values are key-value-pairs, enriching stereotypes 
with additional information. UMLs' syntax and semantic is not touched by UML profile extensions. 
 
The UML2 profile for IdM supports the modelling of access control policies within activity 
diagrams. In case of a business process it offers the possibility to represent its behaviour as well as 
its constraints for accessing certain actions. The model of the UML2 profile for IdM is shown in 
Figure 1. The element «IdMAction» extends the UMLs' activity diagram element «action», 
indicating that this must be secured by the IdM infrastructure. It contains the attributes 
complianceClassifier and securityClassifier providing the possibility to classify the element 
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according to its compliance and security guidelines. Those are defined at the enterprise 
architectural level. The container element «Policy» links single «Permission» elements in a 
disjunctive manner; this allows the reuse of «Permission» elements in different «Policy» elements 
or policies. «Policy» owns the same classification attributes as «IdMAction». In order to avoid 
conflicts due to contradicting policies as well as to reduce complexity at the business process level, 
only one policy may be assigned to an «IdMAction». «Permission» elements encapsulate one or 
more «Assertion» elements for covering one access control situation. The element «Assertion» 
contains the positive access control statement, allowing access on resources. This means that every 
access authorisation has to be defined in a dedicated permission. An «Assertion» element 
aggregates «SubjectAttribute», «ObjectAttribute», «EnvironmentAttribute», «InputParameter» and 
«Constant». 
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Figure 1: The UML2 Profile for Identity Management 
 
The object being accessed is described by the «ObjectAttribute». A sophisticated enterprise 
architecture with well-defined business objects types supports the selection of relevant object 
attributes tremendously. «EnvironmentAttribute» contains metadata such as time, date and the 
systems conditions whereas «InputParameter» specifies input data. For comparing attributes with 
specific values, «Constant» is used. In case the business department was not able to to properly 
define an adequate policy with these modelling concepts, a «DraftedPermission» contains access 
control statements without formalisation, i.e. descriptions of the desired behaviour in prose. These 
drafts must be refined by business security analysts resulting in a valid set of «Permission» and 
«Policy» elements. «IdMRole» extends the concept of activity partitions in order to assign business 
roles to «IdMAction» elements. The same pieces of information can also be covered by utilising 
«SubjectAttribute» to describe the business role of the accessing subject – which reduces the visual 
complexity in case of dozens of roles involved in a business process. We consider the description 
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of roles not in the classical role-based access control (RBAC) [10] manner but define a business 
role as a set of subjects attributes as described in [42]. «IdMActivityGroup» allows grouping of 
elements for assigning a «Policy» or «DraftedPermission» only once to a set of elements. An 
overview regarding the elements' constraints defined in the meta-model is given in [22]. 
 
2.3. WSACML – An Access Control Meta-model for Web Service-Oriented Architecture  
 
Looking at the mass and complexity of the existing and upcoming specifications in the web service 
security area like WS-Security, WS-Trust, SAML, eXtensible Access Control Markup Language  
(XACML) or the Liberty Alliance’s stack proposal [12, 30], it is comprehensible that software 
developers often neglect the web service security part. Additionally, state-of-the-art IdM suites are 
not yet prepared for web service-oriented architectures and their accompanying standards [29]. At 
the same time application servers often do not yet support necessary combinations of relevant IdM 
standards. This is why currently existing web services in most cases have little or no security 
features. In [8] we have introduced WSACML, an access control meta-model for web service-
oriented architectures which is utilised as meta-model for the platform independent model (PIM). It 
eases its use, as complexity like in XACML is reduced. WSACML describes policies at the PIM 
level, which means that they are specified with detailed technical resource descriptions etc. but 
platform specific details and notations for security products are not covered. This is done by a last 
transformation shown in detail in [9]. 
 
2.4. From the Business Process to Concrete Security Policies – The Transformation Process 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of Model-driven Policy Development 
 
In order to create security policies for a certain IdM product, we have implemented a prototypical 
model-driven transformation process with two transformations (cf. Figure 2). To ease the 
implementation process we utilise a XML-based transformation approach. We generate XML 
schema definitions (XSDs) based on the meta-models for the CIM and PIM introduced in the 
previous sections and use them as a template for valid policy information. We start with a business 
process that has already been modelled and which has been annotated with security policies and 
extract security-specific information to a XML file (cf. Listing 1). In a second step a Java-based 
application parses this XML-file structured according to the rules of our XSD and transforms the 
elements according to the mapping rules shown in Table 1. Then it checks the compliance with 
constraints described in [22]. During the transformation process a manual enrichment has to be 
done by a business security analyst. This analyst should be able to provide additional information 
for a fine tuning of the security requirements for the platform independent model.
CIM
UML2 Profile for IdM 
[22]
PIM
WSACML
[8]
PSM/PSC
Product Policies
[9]
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UML2 Profile for IdM WSACML 
IdMAction Manually resolved to service description and mapped to ServiceOperationBinding 
IdMRole Builds some parts of the SubjectAttribute 
IdMActivityGroup Assignment of the same policy to all IdMActions in this area 
Policy Policy 
DraftedPermission Empty Policy containing comments, which must be refined by a business security 
analyst. 
Permission Rule 
Assertion Assertion 
*Attribute *Attribute 
The * stands for all attributes shown in the meta-model of the UML2 profile for IdM (cf. Figure 1) 
Table 1: Mapping rules for the UML2 Profile for IdM to WSACML 
 
The first transformation process results in a WSACML policy shown in Listing 2. Utilising the 
transformation described in [9], the generation of platform specific code (PSC) comes into play: 
WSACML policies are transformed into security policies for a certain product. This requires 
knowledge on the policy-model of the specific security software product. Further information will 
be provided in [9]. Currently, our transformer tool supports the generation of CA SiteMinder 
policies. A support for IBM Tivoli Access Manager is under development at the moment. 
 
<SecureBusinessProcess> 
  <idmAction complianceClassifier="1"  
    securityClassifier="2"  
    name="Override Scoring Exception"> 
    <policyLink  
      policyName="Override Scoring Policy" /> 
  </idmAction> 
  <policy name="Override Scoring Policy"> 
    <permissionLink     
      permissionName="ScoringPermission"/> 
  </policy> 
  <permission name="ScoringPermission"> 
    <assertion assertionFunction="equal"> 
      <subjectAttribute value="roleName" /> 
      <constant value="AM in chief " /> 
    </assertion> 
    <assertion assertionFunction="equal"> 
      <objectAttribute  
        value="exception.type" /> 
      <constant value="warning" /> 
    </assertion> 
    <assertion assertionFunction="less-than"> 
      <objectAttribute  
        value="exception.score" /> 
      <constant value="4" /> 
    </assertion> 
  </permission> 
</SecureBusinessProcess> 
<PolicyContainer> 
  <policy name="Override Scoring Exception" 
    ruleSelectionAlgorithm="--TODO--"  
    serviceOperationBinding 
      ="--TODO--Override Scoring Exception"> 
    <ruleref>ScoringPermission</ruleref> 
  </policy> 
  <rule name="ScoringPermission"> 
    <assertion assertionFunction="equal"> 
      <subjectAttribute value="roleName" /> 
      <constant value="AM in chief" />" /> 
    </assertion> 
    <assertion assertionFunction="equal"> 
      <objectAttribute  
        value="exception.type" /> 
      <constant value="warning" /> 
    </assertion> 
    <assertion assertionFunction="less-    
        than"> 
      <objectAttribute  
        value="exception.score" /> 
      <constant value="4" /> 
    </assertion> 
  </rule> 
</PolicyContainer> 
Listing 1: UML2 Profile for IdM (XML representation) Listing 2: WSACML 
 
3. Example: Securing a Banking Process 
 
In the banking area business processes are changing often, caused by a very dynamic and customer-
driven market environment. As a typical example we choose the opening process for a current 
account. As the presentation of the complete process might well go beyond the scope of this paper, 
we show only sections of the process as this should be enough to get an idea of how our method is 
applied to secure the business process. Figure 3 shows the business process model with security-
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related information added. After a general contract has been created by an account manager the 
opening of a current account is checked. When the application for a current account is formally 
correct, a credit rating service is called, followed by a scoring by another service. These actions are 
secured by the Check Account Opening Policy. The policy limits the roles that are allowed to 
execute those actions to the role 'Account manager' and it may have some contextual restrictions 
like 'Opening a current account is allowed only at the office times from 7am to 7pm'. If there are no 
exceptions, the current account will be created; otherwise the opening is delegated to the clerk's 
supervisor who may override some kind of exceptions (exception score lower than four). This is 
represented by the Override Scoring Policy shown in Listing 1 which limits the executing role to 
‘Account manager (AM) in chief’ and the exception level lower to four. 
 
<<IdMActivityGroup>>
<<IdMAction>>
Call Credit Rating Service
<<IdMAction>>
Create General Contract
<<IdMAction>>
Check Account Opening
<<IdMAction>>
Call Scoring Service
<<IdMAction>>
Override Scoring Exception
<<Policy>>
Check Account Opening Policy
<<DraftedPermission>>
Override Scoring Policy
 
Figure 2: Secured Business Process Model for Opening a Current Account 
 
4. Related Work 
 
Concerning the integration of requirements in models, many papers have been published recently. 
The state of the art can be divided into two major parts: On the one hand high level models for 
usage at business departments, on the other hand IT-centric models like UML class diagrams that 
are enriched by annotations and requirements. In the area of models for usage at the business site 
[23] extends the UML activity diagram enabling a modelling of business and performance goals for 
use with concepts like balanced score card. An extension for the UML activity diagram to model 
event-driven process chains (EPC) is shown in [24]. In both papers UML is extended via its profile 
mechanism. 
In the area of information security a meta-model for descriptive collection of requirements is shown 
in [37, 38]. It is applied to the UML activity diagram via an UML profile as well as to BPMNs' 
meta-model. Stereotypes like SecurityAuditing or SecurityRequirement are introduced for usage in 
the business process model in order to visualise requirements for auditing or the core security 
requirements like authentication, authorisation and non-repudiation. Nevertheless, most of this 
work remains at a descriptive level. The stereotypes introduced are just simple annotations 
comparable with classified comments. In [39] Rodríguez et al. propose the generation of use case 
views out of business process models which are examined for security requirements. As in their 
previous work [37, 38], there are no possibilities to specify requirements directly in the business 
process model and the proposed approach can be only used to find security problems at a high level 
view. Round trip engineering is missing, so that results found in the use case diagrams can not be 
added to the processes' model. 
In [40] another solution for modelling security goals in BPMN is introduced: A generic security 
model captures the relations between basic entities like objects, attributes, interactions and effects. 
The model includes views on the enterprise architectural space which allows connecting elements 
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from different perspectives. However, it lacks a relationship with the model-driven approach as 
well as definitions of how policies can be formulated, stored and administrated. In their previous 
work ([41]) Wolter et al. have proposed an extension of the BPMN for including authorisation 
constraints which are strongly focused on a separation of duties (SoD). Utilising XSLT 
transformations, the XML representation of the enriched business process is used for generating 
XACML policies. However, they do not discuss the modelling of complex access control scenarios. 
In contrast to our work, their target model is XACML – this is basically a good idea as it is a 
standard – but as the application of XACML policies in standard access control products is only 
partly possible, it would be better to generate concrete policies for certain products. 
In the area of workflow security, some further work has been published. In [14] a UML based 
approach for applying security requirements to the Web Service Choreography Description 
Language (WS-CDL) is proposed. A UML model of the workflow is enriched with security 
artefacts and could be translated to XML code files that comply with web services standards. As 
this enrichment is done on a technical level, the procedure will not be viable for the typical 
business department. Bertino et al. present in [2] how Web Services Business Process Execution 
Language (WS-BPEL) is enriched by authorisation constraints and authorisation information for 
access control. They introduce the Business Process Constraint Language (BPCL) which allows 
formulating the authorisation constraints. A WS-BPEL engine has been extended to be able to 
interpret these access control constraints. BPCL is limited to users, roles and activities. Attribute-
based access control which we propose as the optimum for service-oriented architecture is not 
supported. Due to its technical focus, it is not adequate for use at a business department.  
Patterns for securing web services are proposed in [18]. The so called idioms were applied to 
orchestrated services and contain technical solutions and templates for predefined threat scenarios. 
They cover non-functional requirements but only at the orchestration level. An explicit possibility 
for modelling access control policies or IdM requirements is not given. 
Looking at IT-centric research, in [19] an UML profile called UMLsec for modelling safety critical 
systems is shown. It supports the enrichment of UML class models with security relevant 
information. Its focus is to support software developers who already are knowledgeable in the 
security area. The recording of access control policies, especially at the business departments' level 
is not covered. An UML-based modelling notation combined with a notation for specifying access 
control models is shown in [26]. This approach is also placed rather late in the software 
development process, as the requirements are modelled at the class diagrams' level. In [5], Breu et 
al. propose a model-based development of access policies combining a predicative language (OCL) 
with XACML as an access policy standard. Access permissions can be specified for methods and 
method categories at a technical level. A Java-based tool allows the generation of XACML 
policies. Like other approaches mentioned before, the technical focus of this approach will most 
likely prevent its application in the context of business departments. Neubauer et al. cover in [28] 
aspects of secure business processes and its administration. The roadmap of a secure business 
process is shown in its different stages regarding the inclusion of security aspects. At the second 
stage he describes the security enriched business process as a base for workflow systems. 
 
Looking at related work, there is on the one hand a very strong focus on business aspects with no 
possibilities of integrating security requirements. On the other hand the modelling of security 
requirements is possible on a deeper, workflow or technical level. These solutions often require 
specialised knowledge of modelling and the architectural aspects of software systems as well as a 
wide and detailed knowledge on security solutions. Altogether, a gap between modelled business 
processes at the business departments’ site and documents and tools containing the business 
process' security specifications remains. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we propose a model-driven development process for the creation of access control 
policies in the context of service-oriented architectures. The development starts with the business 
process model at the business departments' level, where computational independent process models 
are enriched with elements for specifying requirements for identity management. Transformation 
processes translate the model to concrete security policies for different commercial products. The 
novel aspect of this approach is the direct application of IdM requirements specifications to 
business process specifications. Thus, the model-driven generation of access control policies can be 
supported. There is no need for document-based requirement specifications, because all 
requirements are captured in the business process model where the domain knowledge is available 
– in the business department. This work lays the fundament by proposing how access control 
policies can be specified in business processes. Future work will be done on improving the 
graphical modelling of the business process and its security requirements. The business department 
will be supported by easy to handle tools, with optimised usability for modelling security enriched 
business processes. The modelling process will be complemented by utilising policy and business 
objects repositories to benefit from (re)using existing data. Another aspect being worked on will be 
the checking of secured business process models for being in compliance with the enterprise’s 
security standards or law regulations. 
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